Peer Reviewed Articles Precise Steps Local Law Enforcement Take for Homeland Security
Introduction
The attacks of September xi, 2001, gave ascent to dialogue almost the role local law enforcement organizations should play in America's homeland security efforts. Some scholars accept suggested a paradigmatic shift in law work is underway as state and local regime presume increased responsibilities for the prevention of and response to large‐scale terrorist incidents (Jackson & Dark-brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007). During the past 10 years, many agencies have enhanced emergency preparedness through a diverseness of measures including, but non limited to, completing risk assessments, gathering and/or disseminating terrorism‐related intelligence, updating or entering into common aid agreements, participating in joint‐training activities, and developing formal written response plans for terrorist incidents (Caruson, MacManus, Kohen, & Watson, 2005; Council of State Governments, 2005; Davis et al., 2004; Davis, Mariano, Pace, Cotton fiber, & Steinberg, 2006; Pelfrey, 2007). These measures are not undertaken universally. For example, Pelfrey (2007) found that but a quarter of South Carolina law enforcement agencies had a policy addressing terrorist threats. Davis et al. (2006) reported that more than half of law enforcement agencies surveyed updated mutual aid agreements for the purposes of terrorism, emergency response, or both. Despite both proposed and actual changes in emergency grooming, relatively few empirical studies have examined how American law enforcement agencies take addressed the homeland security office (run across, e.one thousand., Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Gerber, Cohen, Cannon, Patterson, & Stewart, 2005; Jiao & Rhea, 2007; Ortiz et al., 2007; Pelfrey, 2007).
What factors explain inter‐organizational variation in homeland security preparedness? Extant research highlights 2 key factors: take chances and budgetary resource. Empirical show suggests that organizations respond rationally to prevailing risks of a terrorist assault and the lure of external funding, peculiarly grants, by undertaking more preparedness activities (e.m., Davis et al., 2004; Davis et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2005). A factor that existing research has not addressed, however, is the ecology influence that may shape organizational structures independent of threats or supplemental funding streams. The institutional environment, external actors or organizations having power to prescribe or proscribe appropriate structures or actions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), has arguably promoted homeland security preparedness through a variety of channels. Authorities organizations including the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Department of Homeland Security accept produced guides and scholars accept highlighted appropriate practices in academic journals (e.thousand., Henry, 2002; Jackson & Brownish, 2007). A diverse carte of training programs offered by organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Law Enforcement Preparation Center, and other land and federal organizations might besides be relevant. These and other institutional forces might take a strong influence on preparedness activities, independent of funding or adventure measures.
The present study seeks to develop a broader understanding of how run a risk, funding, and environmental influences have shaped homeland security measures implemented past local law enforcement. The analysis is guided by iii organizational theories—contingency, resource dependence, and institutional. Contingency and resource dependence theories include risk and funding measures, respectively. Homeland security research has frequently discussed these influences but exterior of whatever theoretical framework. Nosotros examine measures derived from these theories forth with indicators derived from institutional theory; this allows the assay to business relationship for environmental influences via institutional forces such as conferences, preparation, and publications. The results have implications for the development of criminal justice theory, specifically in understanding the actions of organizations as a whole (Bernard & Engel, 2001; Duffee & Maguire, 2007; Kraska, 2004). The results also advise avenues to encourage the adoption of specific structures and activities (e.1000., disseminate ideas via journals v. classify funds) if farther homeland security preparedness is deemed necessary and advisable for local police enforcement agencies.
Theoretical Framework
Contingency Theory
The contingency perspective suggests that homeland security preparedness is a rational response to prevailing threats and internal agency characteristics such every bit organizational size. The theory's logic is axiomatic in a number of "idea" or prescriptive pieces arguing for the need for change in law enforcement organizations in order to address homeland security matters. Jiao and Rhea (2007), for example, argued that reorganization in a police section is undertaken, "to address potential terrorist attacks more than effectively" (p. 389). Similarly, Henry (2002) stated that, "to be effective, agencies must work together cooperatively and their personnel must exist properly equipped and properly trained to chop-chop assess and react to crisis situations in a strategic and flexible manner" (p. 322). The implication of these statements is that law enforcement agencies must modify in social club to remain effective in the mail service‐9/11 world. Failure to do and so potentially leaves the jurisdiction vulnerable to an set on and any department response weak or futile. These prescriptions ignore variations beyond departments and departmental environments such that a "one size fits all" approach to homeland security may not be advisable.
Prior to the mid‐twentieth century, theories of organization were primarily prescriptive, promulgating ideal organizational structures applicable to all organizations irrespective of their variations (Tausky, 1978). This dominant view changed in the 1960s with a series of studies showing that an organization'southward structures were related to a number of factors (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965). Advisable organization structures or activities depend, or are contingent, upon factors such as ecology characteristics (e.g., public demands, criminal offence rates), organizational size, and other determinants. The choice an organisation makes via its leadership is presumed to be rational, linked to the want to maintain or enhance organizational effectiveness (Donaldson, 1995, 1999, 2001). As Donaldson (2001) noted:
Because the fit of organizational characteristics to contingencies leads to high operation, organizations seek to attain fit. For this reason, organizations are motivated to avert misfit that results later on contingency change, and do then past adopting new organizational characteristics that fit the new levels of the contingencies. Therefore, the organization becomes shaped by the contingencies, because it needs to fit them to avert loss of performance. (p. ii)
Donaldson (1995) referred to his model as the structural‐adaptation‐to‐regain‐fit (SARFIT) model, emphasizing the link between the theory'southward iii elements: contingencies, structures/activities, and performance.
The number of contingencies that might affect an organization is seemingly endless but several are often included in policing inquiry and are relevant to the word of homeland security preparedness. The nature and volume of offense in a community might be presumed to influence local police force organizations. For example, Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2007) suggested that the adoption of COMPSTAT in the New York City Police Department was motivated by crime reduction concerns. The evidence is not ever so equivocal, withal. Katz (2001) examined a gang unit in a single police agency and found that its creation was unrelated to any gang trouble in the jurisdiction. Similarly, Katz, Maguire, and Roncek (2002) found that crime variables did not sufficiently predict the being of gang units in a sample of large police force agencies. Based on these three studies, the salience of crime as a contingency cistron predicting organizational structures is questionable.
Agency size is another commonly studied contingency factor. Maguire (2003) constitute that size was straight related to three measures of structural complication (number of command levels in the organization, number of special units, and number of spatial divisions [beats, stations]), dimensions of structure reflecting how an organization divides work. Size was unrelated to control mechanisms such as the degree of centralization in the organization or the number of formal policies in existence (Maguire, 2003). In spite of these mixed results, the full general consensus is that size does affair in determining organizational structures (e.one thousand., Crank & Wells, 1991; Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003; Slovak, 1986).
Contingency theory has rarely been applied to the report of homeland security preparedness. Jiao and Rhea (2007), in their study of vi agencies, highlighted the value of contingency theory and the need for law organizations to "arrange to [their] dynamic environment" (p. 402). Although the authors plant that significant changes had occurred in law enforcement agencies since September 11, 2001 (eastward.g., changes in structure, cooperation with other agencies), they causeless environmental dynamism and did not utilise any external contingency factors such as risk or law-breaking to predict organizational and operational changes. Other scholars examined contingency factors in studies not framed as explicit tests of the theory. The threat of a terrorist set on, similar offense more by and large, might force organizations to adapt. Equally the adventure of an attack in a law enforcement agency's jurisdiction increases, the agency responds past taking measures to set up for and respond to any incident. The available research on the influence of threat is inconsistent. For instance, a serial of studies by the RAND Corporation showed that homeland security preparedness was directly related to the perceived threat of an attack (eastward.1000., Davis et al., 2004). In dissimilarity, Gerber et al. (2005) found no pregnant relationship between the perceived threat of an attack and testing an emergency response plan or updating common help agreements. The discrepancy in findings could be related to the measurement of preparedness with the RAND measures being more inclusive (e.g., training, increased spending, run a risk assessments, updated response plans, etc.).
Agency size and jurisdiction size have as well been linked to preparedness activities (Davis et al., 2004; Gerber et al., 2005; Jiao & Rhea, 2007; Pelfrey, 2007). Larger agencies (or agencies with more than populous jurisdictions) tend to take more measures than smaller (or less populous) jurisdictions. 1 potential explanation for this finding relates to the threat perspective discussed above: larger jurisdictions arguably accept more than potential targets. A second explanation considers size as an internal organizational feature. Viewed from an organizational perspective, measures such as updating terrorism policies or procedures (Pelfrey, 2007), entering into mutual assist agreements (Gerber et al., 2005), and adding specialized units (Davis et al., 2004), all items that are included in various preparedness measures, represent increasing formalization (policies, common assistance agreements) and horizontal differentiation (special units). Researchers take mostly found that larger organizations are more complex across a diverseness of dimensions, including formalization and horizontal differentiation (come across, e.g., Blau, 1970; Blau & Schoenherr, 1971; Langworthy, 1986; Maguire, 2003). Big organizations may simply take certain preparedness activities in gild to divide up and coordinate homeland security‐related tasks (come across Maguire, 2003, for an extensive discussion of coordination and control mechanisms).
Resource Dependence Theory
Resource dependence theory offers a second framework for understanding homeland security preparedness in local agencies. Developed during the 1970s, the theory emphasizes inter‐organizational power relations and the need for resources, peculiarly monetary resources. Few organizations in gild are self‐sufficient; virtually require support from outside sources (e.g., legislatures, customers, granting agencies, etc.) in social club to survive (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer, 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The very fact that organizations rely on this external support means that they are, to varying degrees, dependent upon these resources providers. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), in their classic work on resource dependence theory, wrote "interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the weather condition necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action" (p. 40). If resources are scarce, if resource menses is unpredictable, or if few other sources of resources exist, asymmetrical power relationships emerge where the resource provider becomes capable of making demands of the organization dependent upon those resources (Aldrich, 1999; Jaffee, 2001; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The result is an exchange relationship where an organization trades some degree of command of its operations and activities for critical resource: "It is the fact of the organization's dependence on the environment that makes the external constraint and control of organizational behavior both possible and most inevitable" (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 43). Organizations chance losing critical resources unless they comply with the demands of resource providers.
Resource dependence theory is evident, though in many cases implicitly, in a diversity of works in policing. For instance, Oliver (2000) argued that the adoption of community policing became widespread during the 1990s: "Many of the agencies coming to community policing during the 3rd generation were simply seeking grant funding, and they would hire the officers every bit community‐policing officers" (p. 379). Katz et al. (2002) tested resource dependence theory and found a funding variable (receipt of resource from local, land, or federal sources) was a strong predictor of the being of a gang unit of measurement in a national sample of police agencies. The funding variable was more than salient than crime‐related measures derived from contingency theory.
Some testify supports a resources dependence view of homeland security preparedness as well. The federal government's resource contributions to the homeland security efforts of local law enforcement agencies have increased immensely over the by decade and, especially, since September 11, 2001 (Clarke & Chenoweth, 2006; Prante & Bohara, 2008). For example, the Homeland Security Appropriations Act for fiscal yr 2005 provided approximately $400 one thousand thousand for state and local law enforcement agencies (Clarke & Chenoweth, 2006). Similarly, the Homeland Security Grant Program, administered past the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, distributed $1.half-dozen billion to facilitate preparedness at the land and local level (Prante & Bohara, 2008). Funding allocation decisions have been widely criticized for neglecting or diminishing take chances as a prime number consideration (a contingency cistron), though this criticism has not been supported in all studies (see Prante & Bohara, 2008). Decisions are by and large based on a diverseness of factors including risk, political connections, population size, and other formula components (Clarke & Chenoweth, 2006; Prante & Bohara, 2008; Roberts, 2005). Moreover, many of the funding opportunities come with programmatic elements attached: agencies are eligible for receipt of funding if they comply with the typically wide goals outlined in the funding programs and/or accept completed mandated training (i.e., the National Incident Direction System or Incident Command System).
Back up for the resource dependence view is evident in a number of studies of terrorism preparedness (e.g., Davis et al., 2004; Gerber et al., 2005). Gerber et al. (2005), for case, found that cities facing budgetary constraints were—controlling for risk, city size, and other factors—less likely to accept preparedness measures. It appears that preparedness is stimulated by external support for police enforcement homeland security activities. Similarly, receiving increased funding for terrorism preparedness and/or federal support for terrorism preparedness was related to a variety of preparedness indicators in constabulary enforcement agencies (Davis et al., 2006).
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory suggests that organizational practices, including homeland security practices, reflect expectations about advisable system beliefs rather than rational responses to environmental contingencies. In their seminal work, Meyer and Rowan (1977) debate, "the formal structures of many organizations … dramatically reverberate the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities" (p. 341). In other words, these myths link organizational practices with outcomes. The problem is that, in many cases, agencies fail to document the effectiveness of these practices. Nevertheless, the practices are "hypothetically associated" with performance and that is what matters (Lipsky, 1980, p. 51). Whether the supported practices actually ameliorate performance is less of import than the belief that the link between practice and performance is true ("institutional myths" according to Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Equally a upshot, organizations are under immense pressure to adopt these widely supported practices to demonstrate "organizational worth" and to bring legitimacy to the arrangement (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988, p. 53).
Many of the pressures faced by organizations, including law enforcement organizations, are centrist in nature (Crank & Langworthy, 1996; Renauer, 2007). They are thought to have a broad effect on an industry every bit a whole (and all the organizations inside information technology) as opposed to local pressures which only take a narrow influence. Organizations are constrained to the extent that there are only a limited number of adequate or appropriate organizational features that are viewed as legitimate. Equally a result, they volition tend to resemble one another in structure and practice, a phenomenon known as isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) offer three processes that contribute to isomorphism and homogeneity in an industry: coercive, mimetic, and normative processes. Coercive isomorphism results when an organization is forced to adopt certain practices or structures in response to external pressures from powerful organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Creepo and Rehm (1994), for example, noted how court decisions shaped a drug intervention program and Tolbert and Zucker (1983) argued that state laws mandating civil service structures were followed past their rapid adoption. The second source of isomorphism, mimetic processes, results from i arrangement imitating the practices of another organization perceived to exist successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Katz, 2001; Mastrofski & Uchida, 1993; Roy & Seguin, 2000). Using the civil service example, the success and legitimization that accompanied early adopters, who adopted under coercive pressures, may take fueled subsequently adoption via mimetic processes (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The tertiary source of isomorphism results from normative processes such every bit teaching and preparation. For instance, professional networks and associations provide channels for broadcasting of successful structures and activities, once more leading to isomorphism (Roy & Seguin, 2000). This knowledge is ultimately brought into organizations by employees. These processes embody the widely shared beliefs and issue in the incorporation of certain structures and practices inside organizations.
Institutional theory gained traction in policing research during the 1990s and has since been used in a number of studies (Crank & Langworthy, 1992, 1996; Creepo & Rehm, 1994; Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002; Giblin, 2006; Katz, 2001; Mastrofski & Uchida, 1993; Renauer, 2007; Willis et al., 2007; Wilson, 2005, 2006; Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 2003; Zhao, Lovrich, & Robinson, 2001). Several examples illustrate the utility of institutional theory. In their study of the adoption of COMPSTAT in 3 law enforcement agencies, Willis et al. (2007) establish that the New York City model was a powerful influence; "should a department implement a COMPSTAT plan that does not closely resemble what COMPSTAT is expected to await like (the NYPD model), it risks forfeiting the innovation's legitimating value" (p. 160; accent in original). This emulation or mimesis was evident in Crank and Rehm's study of Functioning Valkyrie (1994). The constabulary practice served as a model for other law enforcement agencies and its elements were communicated via a newsletter. Others accept highlighted the salience of training in generating isomorphism. Engel et al. (2002) suggested that racial profiling might have proliferated equally agency representatives learned drug courier profiling techniques developed past the Drug Enforcement Administration. The acquired knowledge was and so transmitted to others in their habitation departments.
Institutional theory has yet to be explicitly used to explain homeland security preparedness in law enforcement agencies. Even so, it is clear that the institutional environment is supportive of enhanced homeland security preparedness in law enforcement agencies. A number of government publications describe the function of law enforcement authorities in various mass‐prey emergency situations (eastward.grand., Chapman et al., 2002; Federal Emergency Direction Agency, 1996; Leson, 2005; Richards, Rathbun, Brito, & Luna, 2006). These publications depict, among other things, "the types of resources that police may desire to consider when developing their ain terrorism prevention and response programme" (Chapman et al., 2002, p. 1). This prescriptive focus is visible in bookish publications too (e.g., Henry, 2002; Jiao & Rhea, 2007). To the extent that these resources are consulted, the ideas contained therein might be adopted in whole or in office past a reader's organization. Similarly, organizations that send representatives to any of the many state or federal preparation programs or professional conferences might also render with and comprise newfound knowledge. For example, the Department of Homeland Security's Training and Exercise Integration Secretariat/Training Operations (TEI/TO) "make[south] high quality training available to kickoff responders that enhances their skills for preventing, protecting, responding to, and recovering from manmade and natural catastrophic events" (TEI/TO, n.d., p. 2). Lastly, given the emphasis on coordination and interagency chore forces in the literature (e.g., Caruson et al., 2005), agencies might serve equally models for one another leading to mimesis. In fact, the Police force Executive Research Forum, in a written report circulated weeks after the September 11 attacks, supported the idea of modeling best practices (Police Executive Research Forum, 2001).
The institutional environs arguably pressures law enforcement agencies to advance their homeland security practices through conferences, preparation workshops, publications, and model agencies. These pressures are hypothesized to operate independently of other considerations: agencies raise their preparedness considering information technology is the advisable thing to do as signaled past the external organizational surroundings regardless of risk assessment or funding availability. These pressures, however, have non been subjected to empirical scrutiny.
Enquiry Objective
The present written report examined the effects of institutional pressures on homeland security preparedness among police force enforcement agencies in Illinois. Specifically, the report situated existing measures (risk, funding) within an organizational theory context and assesses their importance relative to institutional pressures (mimetic, publications, and professional person associations). We hypothesized that institutional pressures will lead to isomorphism as agencies attempt to conform to institutional expectations most appropriate activities in a homeland security era. To test this hypothesis, we evaluated the theories simultaneously through structural equation modeling. This method is peculiarly suited for testing theory for 3 reasons: (one) it can be used to evaluate whether the theoretical model is viable through goodness‐of‐fit measures; (ii) it can be used to gauge the individual effects of the theoretical measures; and (three) it can be used to approximate the overall variation in homeland security preparedness.
Methods
Sample
Information for the present study were collected every bit part of the Illinois Homeland Security Survey (IHSS), a statewide survey of constabulary enforcement agencies that addressed terrorism‐related preparedness issues. The survey, administered in the fall of 2007, was sent to all sworn police force enforcement agencies in the state: municipal, sheriff, state police, railroad, campus, park, infirmary, and other miscellaneous agencies (N = 1,047). Nosotros identified the population of agencies by a state common assist organization, which included all agencies regardless of their affiliation with the system. Afterward ii survey mailings sent over approximately two months, we received completed surveys from 535 respondents (51.i%).
Municipal police and county sheriff organizations represented approximately 92% of the population and the responding agencies. For purposes of the present report, "other" agencies were eliminated from the sample given the diverseness in agency type and the pocket-sized number of agencies in each category (the municipal/sheriff response charge per unit exceeded 51%). Table ane presents the results of a chi‐square goodness of fit test comparing the sample to known population parameters. The IHSS sample reflected the statewide agency population in terms of agency type and region. A statistically significant divergence existed with respect to agency size; the IHSS sample nether‐represented the smallest agencies (0–10 FT sworn officers) while over‐representing medium size agencies (11–99 FT sworn officers).
Table 1 Comparison of Illinois Homeland Security Survey sample to bureau population1
Nosotros mailed the survey to the chief executive of each bureau (e.yard., principal, commissioner, sheriff). In some situations, agency leaders forwarded the survey on to other agency members including deputy chiefs, commanders, and other personnel. Regardless of the specific position of the respondent, the individual acted equally an informant about the agency's homeland security practices. This raises the business that the respondent does not have total cognition of departmental operations and may not be in a position to provide accurate answers. Such a business concern is minimized when survey instruments only address part of an agency'south operations, in this case homeland security practices; nosotros presumed that the respondent has the requisite cognition and, if the chief executive forwarded the survey, that he/she passed it forth to an individual with the ability to accurately respond to the questions.
The final sample size, after listwise deletion from the analysis, was 348 agencies. We assume the missing cases are missing at random. A chi‐square test for independence on each variable detected no differences between the distributions of responses for the full sample versus the reduced sample, suggesting no pattern in missing data. Furthermore, nosotros reran the analysis with imputation for missing cases in Mplus—the results were nearly identical.
Measures
Dependent variable
The dependent variable captured terrorism‐related emergency preparedness policies and practices in the sample of law enforcement agencies. Specifically, respondents were asked to identify which of ten common actions their agency had taken since September 11, 2001, to heighten terrorism‐related emergency preparedness. 1 The list included responses such every bit creating a special unit, participating in field‐training exercises, and increasing the number staff dedicated to addressing emergency preparedness (see Tabular array 2 for complete list). In addition, we presented respondents with eight questions addressing specific policy directives (e.g., contacting proper authorizes in event of a terrorist threat), personnel (e.thousand., being of intelligence analysts), and activities (e.g., risk assessments) (see Table 2 for complete list). Each of the 18 items was coded "ane" indicating the adoption of a particular policy/action or "0" indicating its absence. Responses were summed to create an additive index ranging from 0 to eighteen (alpha = .857).
Tabular array 2 Descriptive statistics of items comprising dependent variable alphabetize (northward = 348).
Independent variables
The outset measure, for contingency theory, represented the perceived risk of a terrorist set on every bit a latent construct. Recall that contingency theorists view organizations as adapting to environmental and internal factors that touch performance (Donaldson, 1995, 2001; Maguire, 2003; Scott, 1998; Tausky, 1978). Terrorist threats pose dandy challenges to law enforcement organizations; terrorist incidents may result in pregnant injury or devastation within a jurisdiction. Every bit such, organizations, faced with threats may adapt in an endeavour to thwart whatever terrorist event. Although measuring the actual or objective gamble of a terrorist attack is challenging, measuring a law enforcement executive'south perceptions of threats is possible. Moreover, one might expect organizations to adapt to issues every bit viewed through individual lenses rather than objective conditions. The subjective take chances construct was captured by half-dozen indictors. Respondents rated the likelihood of each of the following terrorist attacks occurring inside their jurisdiction in the next five years (rated on a 0–x calibration): chemical, biological, radiological, conventional explosive, cyber‐terrorism, and incidents involving armed forces weapons. The variables are labeled Risk one through Risk half dozen, respectively.
A 2nd contingency variable, size of the agency, is besides included. The initial measure of size showed considerable skewness and kurtosis; therefore, we transformed the variable using a log transformation, resulting in a normally distributed variable. Agency size is thus measured equally the log of the number of agency employees. Every bit noted before, there is a considerable body of testify indicating a relationship between size and organizational structures, particularly bureaucratic structures (see Donaldson, 2001). Donaldson writes, "… size fosters the segmentation of labor, and the recurrent nature of many decisions allows them to be formalized" (p. 24). Both formalization (e.g., procedures for distributing advisories) and division of labor (east.one thousand., specialized units) are part of, though non the entirety of, the overall preparedness dependent measure. We hypothesize that size, every bit an internal contingency, requires organizations to handle the homeland security function in certain ways, organizing along more bureaucratic lines.
Resource dependence theory was measured by a summed grants construct. Organizations receiving resources from external agencies relinquish some degree of command to these organizations; they are more likely to comply with demands from the funding arrangement to adopt sure policies or strategies (Katz et al., 2002; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). IHSS respondents were asked to rank the influence (very influential, somewhat influential, not at all influential) of both state and federal grants related to terrorism in formulating their agency'south terrorism response/emergency preparedness. These two indictors comprise the Grants scale (α = .942).
For institutional theory, we used a second‐order gene modeled from previous work on isomorphism in policing (Giblin & Burruss, in press). Institutional pressures is a latent factor that influences constabulary enforcement agencies' policies through various processes. This second‐order factor included iii first‐order latent factors: mimesis, publications, and professional associations. 2 The offset‐order latent factors, in turn, are comprised of various observed measures. The latent factor mimesis is comprised of iii observed categorical indicators. 3 Mimesis 1 asked, "How influential were other police or sheriff's departments in formulating your bureau's current approach or practices related to terrorism response/emergency preparedness?" (ane = not at all influential; iii = very influential). Mimesis 2 asked, "In evaluating your own agency's performance with respect to terrorism response/ emergency preparedness policies and practices, to what extent does your agency pay attention to the policies and practices of other police enforcement agencies like your own?" (one = pay no attention; 4 = pay significant attention). Mimesis 3 asked, "To what extent does your agency model its terrorism response/emergency preparedness policies and/or practices later those of other departments that you view every bit successful?" (one = our agency never models after other agencies; 3 = our bureau often models afterward other agencies). The publications cistron had two observed measures that asked how influential government publications and journal articles or books were in formulating terrorism response/emergency preparedness (Pub one and Pub two, respectively). 4 Finally, the professional associations cistron comprised three observed measures that asked near the influence of the following items on terrorism response/emergency preparedness: (Pro 1) academic courses, seminars, or conferences; (Pro ii) police or sheriff's professional associations (eastward.yard., IACP) or meetings; and (Pro iii) state training programs. 5
Information analysis
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examination our hypothesized model. Specifically, CFA allowed united states of america to consider the influence of two latent factors, institutional pressures and risk perceptions, along with the two observed variables on terrorism preparedness. Without CFA, we could non take measured the private furnishings of the institutional factors—mimesis, publications, and professional associations; instead, we would have had to rely on unmarried proxy indicators. In addition to this do good, CFA incorporates measurement error in each of the model components.
To evaluate the model, we employed weighted to the lowest degree squares mean and variance adjusted estimator (WLSMV) through Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2007). WLSMV is the appropriate estimation for models with categorical indicators (Bollen, 1989; Muthén & Muthén, 2007). Nosotros assessed the model through the Mplus goodness‐of‐fit indices: the chi‐square examination and its p‐value, the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker‐Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). There are full general guidelines to evaluate the fit indices. 6 Generally, the model chi‐square should be non‐significant, indicating that the hypothesized model is non significantly different from a perfectly plumbing equipment model; thus, for a good fit, the p‐value should be greater than 0.05. 7 For the CFI, bound by 0.0 and 1.0, a value above .90 indicates a reasonably good fit. A TLI value above .90 too indicates a good fit, but dissimilar the CFI, the TLI can exist greater than i.0; thus, a value greater than one.2 or less than .90 is indicative of a poor fit (Bollen 1989; Hu & Bentler, 1999). A RMSEA less than or equal to 0.06 indicates a close fit, betwixt 0.06 and 0.10 indicates a reasonable fit, and greater than 0.10 indicates a poor fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). We too evaluated the models based on the noun loading of each latent factor on the observed variables. Generally, we expected that each of the latent variables will accept a reasonably high and statistically significant gene loading on the observed variables; a standardized gene loading is considered reasonable if information technology is above 0.30 (Kline, 2005).
Figure 1 shows the structural path diagram for the hypothesized model. Nosotros hypothesized that an increment in the theoretical measures would increase terrorism preparedness. More specifically, we predicted that institutional pressures would have an contained effect from the contingency and resource dependence measures. Paths for observed variables and latent factors that served equally indicators are labeled with the number i. Fault terms for observed variables and latent factors are indicated by the letter "e". To go on the path diagram simple, nosotros omitted the correlated factors, variables, and mistake terms. All four of the main effect elements in the structural model were designated as correlated (i.e., log size with institutional pressures, log size with risk, etc.).
Threatened Globally, Interim Locally: Modeling Law Enforcement Homeland Security Practices
Published online:
xxx April 2009
Effigy 1 Hypothesized model for terrorism emergency preparedness.
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Results
Earlier reporting the results of the entire model, nosotros examined the 2nd‐lodge measurement model of institutional pressures to ostend its validity as a latent construct. The model, which is shown in Figure 1, achieved a skilful fit to the data (χii = 16.733, p = 0.21; TLI = 0.99; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.03). This was an improvement over a single‐factor model, where institutional pressures has a direct influence on each of the mimesis, pubs, and pro variables (χ2 = 105.025, p = 0.00; TLI = 0.84; CFI = 0.85; RMSEA = 0.13). 8 Based on these results, which replicate a model from a unlike dataset, we ended that the institutional pressures construct was a valid measure of the theory. Thus, we included the second‐lodge construct in the structural model.
Table two reports the per centum responses for the items comprising the dependent variable. The means and standard deviations for the observed independent variables are reported in Table 3 along with the bivariate Pearson correlations. Nosotros detected no issues with multicollinearity.
Tabular array 3 Correlations, means, and standard deviations for observed variables
Next, we report the results of the entire model. Overall the model achieved a practiced fit to the data (χ2 = sixteen.733, p = 0.000; TLI = 0.92; CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.054). While the model chi‐square was significant (indicating a lack of fit), the other fit measures met the criteria for a good fit to the data. Table 4 shows the results of the individual estimates for the path loadings, unstandardized and standardized (β). The observed variables from the risk construct consistently loaded high and all path coefficients were significant. The same was true for the observed variables for the 3 start‐society factors from the institutional pressures construct: mimesis, publications, and professional person associations. Each of the paths for the starting time‐order cistron was significant and loaded on the starting time‐order institutional pressures construct. nine Professional associations loaded the highest (0.929); publications and mimesis loaded at 0.658 and 0.567, respectively.
Table 4 Confirmatory factor assay path coefficients for terrorism preparedness model (northward = 348)
Figure 2 shows the empirical relationships among impact of risk, institutional pressures, grants, and agency size on terrorism preparedness; Table 5 reports the results of the analysis. Amongst the theoretical constructs, agency size had the largest standardized coefficient (β = .428) followed past institutional pressures (β = .365). Risk, while pregnant, has a lower standardized loading than institutional pressures, but larger than grants, which was not significant. The R 2 for terrorism preparedness is 0.51, indicating that the model explains about half of the variation in terrorism preparedness.
Threatened Globally, Acting Locally: Modeling Law Enforcement Homeland Security Practices
Published online:
30 April 2009
Figure 2 Standardized path coefficients for structural model of terrorism emergency preparedness. Notes: NS = path not significant.
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Tabular array 5 Confirmatory factor analysis direct effects path coefficients on terrorism preparedness (northward = 348)
In sum, our hypothesis nearly contingency and institutional theory was supported: the CFA model fit the information and institutional pressures was a significant predictor of preparedness, independent of the resource dependence and contingency measures. In addition, the contingency theory measures, log agency size, and risk assessment significantly predicted the dependent variable. Resources dependence (or grants), all the same, failed to significantly predict preparedness. Finally, the latent second‐order factor for institutional pressures fit the information, replicating findings from another data source and offering further evidence of its utility.
Word and Conclusions
The IHSS data lend strong back up to the awarding of organizational theory as a lens through which homeland security preparedness tin can be understood. Municipal and county agencies in Illinois were significantly influenced by institutional pressures, such every bit professional and government publications, training, professional associations, and the deportment of peer agencies. The results of this assay advance our understanding of homeland security preparedness via institutional theory by suggesting that the larger surroundings is salient. External bodies and individuals including training organizations, professional associations, government agencies, scholars, and other law enforcement agencies can help shape the structures and activities of law enforcement agencies by promoting certain actions. From a theoretical perspective, the results suggest that agencies do not only answer to perceived threats, although gamble is a significant factor. Also, agencies do not announced to be adopting practices in response to the lure of external funding. Instead, agencies are influenced by change agents who can spread ideas and encourage the adoption of certain practices (run across Rogers, 1995; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). These ideas are spread throughout an industry, including the police enforcement industry, through diverse publication channels, peer emulation, and professional person and bookish gatherings and coursework. Police scholars take recognized the importance of these advice channels (see, eastward.one thousand., Klinger, 2003) but few have examined their furnishings (for exceptions, run across Skogan & Hartnett, 2005).
The present study highlights the importance of the institutional surround and suggests that institutional processes are potentially capable of stimulating organizational adoption of sure structures and activities. Enhanced levels of grooming were too facilitated through institutional pressures. This would seem to support the notion that modify can exist effected when agencies are compelled to keep upward with dominant professional practices and to maintain at least the appearance of engaging in progressive and innovative policing. The influence of professional publications, associations, and peers was strongly related with greater levels of homeland security preparedness.
The findings also advance the application of institutional theory in policing and criminal justice, more than more often than not. To date, empirical tests of institutional theory have been limited (encounter, e.g., Crank & Rehm, 1994; Katz, 2001; Willis et al., 2007; Wilson, 2005, 2006; Zhao et al., 2001), largely due to measurement challenges (Maguire & Uchida, 2000). The current report offers an additional test of the institutional theory measurement model adult past Giblin and Burruss (in press). As such, it contributes to the development of criminal justice theory, as the field moves away from purely descriptive studies (Bernard & Engel, 2001). Institutional theory offers a potentially robust explanation for inter‐organizational variation in structures and practices within and exterior of the law enforcement field. The model might offer insight into the adoption of drug courts or other problem‐solving courts (e.one thousand., community, gun), sex offender residency restrictions, "pulling levers" strategies (come across Weisburd & Braga, 2006), and others. The model, developed using observed indicators captured through survey inquiry, can be modified easily to accost these other practices. If the predictive power of the model holds across innovations, institutional theory acquires forcefulness as a more full general theory of criminal justice organizational practices. Continued enquiry and application of the model will serve this stop.
These findings also hold important implications for criminal justice policy and federal efforts to expand homeland security efforts within American communities. Information technology is logical that agency size (expressed as a log) matters in shaping homeland security preparedness. Larger agencies are more than likely to exist plant in areas characterized as metropolitan or urban—areas "where intergovernmental complication is loftier and vulnerabilities are present, local officials tend to study higher levels of intergovernmental cooperation, better‐quality networks, and a higher level of preparedness" (Caruson et al., 2005, p. 167). The majority of the American population resides in such urban centers and those areas accept been expected to be most responsive to perceived security and terrorism threats post‐nine/11. These areas presumably have existing formal relationships that could easily be adjusted to coordinate, collaborate, and puddle personnel expertise, equipment, and resources to enhance the level of training within a given agency. x Though increasing agency size (via either hiring additional personnel or consolidating smaller agencies) might non be a feasible policy recommendation, these observations could be viewed as supporting a greater caste of regional collaboration in homeland security planning and training (Caruson et al., 2005).
This analysis did not show a pregnant effect exhibited by grant funding. Several competing perspectives might help explain the not‐significant influence of state and federal homeland security grants. Resource dependency might not matter in the domain of homeland security, though given the frequent calls for more funding (Council of State Governments, 2005; Eisinger, 2004; Gerber et al., 2005) this seems unlikely. The preparedness calibration used equally the dependent measure in this assay did not include securing grants to learn equipment (i.e., thermal imaging devices, respirators, communications systems, etc.). Several prominent homeland security grant programs are equipment‐specific; they are intended to assist agencies in purchasing equipment, rather than to support hiring personnel or providing/attention training.
Studying homeland security preparation presents assorted methodological challenges. Preparation does not necessarily ensure an efficacious response should an bureau experience a terroristic assail or other critical incident. A well‐prepared agency may struggle when faced with an actual event; likewise, an nether‐prepared agency tin can "rise to the challenge and finer reply" to a critical incident (Fricker, Jacobson, & Davis, 2002, p. 5). Standardized metrics of agency preparation provide consistent ways to assess what a sample of agencies accept done to prepare for a possibility. Though it is reasonable to infer that an bureau engaged in few preparatory measures is unlikely to ascent to the occasion, it becomes difficult to determine whether a given jurisdiction volition effectively respond to an actual disquisitional result.
The findings should be interpreted with several limitations in mind. First, the study was conducted in a single land and it is uncertain whether the aforementioned model of homeland security preparedness would hold for a sample comprised of agencies from another state or even a national sample. That said, two issues minimize the concern about generalizability. The institutional pressures examined are generally centrist in nature (Crank & Langworthy, 1996; Renauer, 2007). They stand for extra‐local processes that are hypothesized to take broad influence on the police enforcement manufacture. Unless unique local pressures are more than salient (e.thou., local political leadership, local funding), nosotros should see these pressures take significant effects across various samples. Any business concern about the external validity of the CFA model is also minimized when ane considers that the model has been replicated elsewhere, using a national sample and a dissimilar innovation (community policing) (Giblin & Burruss, in press). Therefore, the institutional environment does not appear to be Illinois or homeland security specific.
A 2d limitation relates to measurement; the preparedness measure is non a comprehensive list of all possible actions agencies might take. Instead, it comprises ordinarily undertaken actions; survey length considerations precluded united states from asking about other actions (e.g., equipment acquisition). Moreover, it only captures the action as a dichotomy fifty-fifty though in that location are likely qualitative differences across agencies in how a detail action is implemented. These challenges should be addressed in future studies considering the importance of the institutional environment. Every bit the results show, organizational theory has a place in the study of criminal justice organizations and can offering ideas for how to encourage organizational change and the adoption of certain structures and activities.
ane. Measures of preparedness and risk were derived from the RAND Corporation study (Davis et al., 2006) and two surveys conducted by Chermak (2006).
2. Coercive pressures are not included in the latent institutional pressures construct. Although funding pressures are oftentimes considered coercive processes leading to isomorphism (see, Crank & Langworthy, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), funding is likewise salient in resource dependence theory (Katz et al., 2002). Prior research indicated that modeling funding as distinct from other institutional processes produces a better plumbing equipment model (Giblin & Burruss, in printing).
3. Each item presented here was reverse coded from the survey.
4. The pb question in the survey and response categories for the pubs and pro variables were the aforementioned as the mimesis variables.
5. We as well included a measure of federal grooming, merely the two training measures were highly correlated. Thus, we used state preparation as the proxy measure for training.
6. This list of fit indices is by no ways exhaustive. We relied on the indices computed by Mplus for the item WLSMV calculator.
vii. The chi‐foursquare fit statistic can lead to an erroneous rejection of the model, specially in models with a large sample (Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2005, pp 135–137). In a large sample, the chi‐square exam is more sensitive to differences; thus, researchers should consider the chi‐foursquare statistic in relation to the sample size and other fit indices. Likewise, the chi‐square obtained from the WLSMV cannot be used for a chi‐foursquare divergence test betwixt models without the proper correction (Muthén & Muthén, 2007).
8. Due to space limitations, we practise not report the full results of the assay.
9. Although the significance of the indicator variables and factors are not reported hither, we examined their significance by simply designating a unlike measure as the indicator. All of measures in this model, including the indicator variables, were significant.
ten. Agencies serving small towns and rural areas might also have less need for the types of formal relations measured in the IHSS and generally expected out of "responsive" agencies post‐9/eleven. Smaller jurisdictions generally savor greater integration and familiarity; officers alive in and know residents of the area (Bass, 1995; Decker, 1979; Galliher, Donavan, & Adams, 1975; Weisheit, Wells, & Falcone, 1994). An constructive response to a critical incident might be achieved via these informal relationships, rather than through formal collaboration with other regional responders.
Source: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07418820902763053
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